Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 1

2014

Holding Up and Holding Out
Colleen V. Chien
Santa Clara University

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2014).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol21/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

HOLDING UP AND HOLDING OUT
Colleen V. Chien*
Cite as: Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out,
21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014).
This manuscript may be accessed online at repository.law.umich.edu.

ABSTRACT
Patent “hold-up” and patent “hold-out” present important, alternative
theories for what ails the patent system. Patent “hold-up” occurs when
a patent owner sues a company when it is most vulnerable—after it has
implemented a technology—and is able wrest a settlement because it is
too late for the company to change course. Patent “hold-out” is the
practice of companies routinely ignoring patents and resisting patent
owner demands because the odds of getting caught are small. Hold-up
has arguably predicted the current patent crises, and the ex ante assertion of technology patents whether in the smartphone war, standards,
or patent “troll” context. Hold-up theory has been embraced by
thought leaders and fueled the current drive by Congress and President
Obama to reform the patent system. This Article makes the counterintuitive case that hold-up theory is wrong—or at least incomplete—because it is missing is full consideration of the other side—the side of
hold-out. When large companies systematically “hold out” on patentees, they have no choice but to work with efficient patent enforcers, or
“trolls.” When small inventors are unfairly disadvantaged in the marketplace, jurors may give them relief in court. Considering hold-out
and hold-up together provide a more complete picture than focusing on
either theory alone. This perspective reveals surprising pathways to a
better patent system, focused on the design, rather than the doctrine, of
patent law. Instead of trying to eliminate all technology patents, or to
enforce all of them, we should try to price them appropriately and reduce the distortions they produce. Instead of trying to make patent law
*
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perfect, we should make it cheaper, more streamlined, and more equitable. To do so, lawmakers should prioritize improving coordination
across courts and agencies, reducing costs through early dispositive
rulings and valuation, and promoting symmetry between parties and
proportionality about the value of a patent through fee- and cost-shifting. Each of these steps would go a long way to curbing both hold-up
and hold-out.
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INTRODUCTION
You have a brilliant idea for a product and use it to start the business of
your dreams. You open your doors, work day and night, and turn that idea
into a successful business. But then, out of nowhere, you get a letter from a
patent troll, asking you to pay money for use of its patents. The timing could
not be worse—your product has traction; you cannot change it now. Your
choices: pay or endure an expensive lawsuit.
This story, adapted from a radio ad campaign profiled by NPR,1 explains the idea of patent hold-up—the practice of patentholders demanding
royalties from a defendant when it is most vulnerable—after it has implemented a technology. The patentholder “holds up” the seller, prompting a
settlement driven by the timing of the demand, rather than its merits.2
Widely theorized and debated in academic and policy circles,3 the concept of patent hold-up has gained prominence by predicting the current patent “crisis,” including the smartphone wars between Apple, Samsung, and
others,4 abuse of standards-essential patents, and the rise of patent trolls5—
all through ex post6 assertions of technology patents. Hold-up has drawn
intense attention to the patent system, and not the good kind. Nobel-prize
winner Gary Becker has blamed a “defective patent system [that] creates
opportunities for hold-ups and excessive litigation.”7 Federal Reserve economists Boldrin and Levine have called for the elimination of the patent sys1.
Laura Sydell, Taking the Battle Against Patent Trolls To The Public, NPR (Aug. 30,
2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/08/30/217272814/taking-the-battleagainst-patent-trolls-to-the-public.
2.
See infra Part I.
3.
See infra Part I.
4.
For a description of these wars and an examination of the patents involved in them,
see Stuart Graham & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Of Smart Phone Wars and Software Patents, 27
J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 73–80 (2013).
5.
A term that refers to entities that do not make products and are focused on the
assertion of patents as their primary business model. Also more politely described as “patent
assertion entities.” See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex
Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300, 313
(2010).
6.
In this context, meaning “after the product has been developed.”
7.
Gary Becker, On Reforming the Patent System, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (July
21, 2013, 2:38 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/on-reforming-the-patentsystem-becker.html.
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tem on the basis of “a gigantic hold-up problem.”8 President Obama has
lamented what he sees as not just patent “hold-up,” but a version of “holdem-up”: when patentholders “hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they
can extort some money out of them.”9
But while embraced by policymakers, public thinkers, and academics,10
patent hold-up theory as it currently exists is wrong—or at least incomplete.
The stakes associated with an incomplete view are high as policymakers are
moving to curb hold-up abuses in a variety of contexts: the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) are scrutinizing patent
trolls11 and others who engage in abuse using standards essential patents.12 In
June 2013, the White House issued five executive actions and seven legislative recommendations to curb the hold-up associated with “frivolous litigation,” pertaining to the quality of computer-implemented claims, feeshifting, and the reach of so-called “functional” software claims; and in February 2014, issued additional actions to increase the patents quality.13 The
U.S. House of Representatives passed the Innovation Act at the end of 2013,
addressing many of these recommendations and the Senate held hearings
and briefings but stopped short of completing the legislative process.14 In its
8.
Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents (Fed. Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Research Div. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf.
9.
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION & U.S. INNOVATION 2
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf
(quoting statements made by President Obama on February 14, 2013).
10.
See discussion infra Part I.
11.
See USDOJ: Antitrust Division Public Workshop—Patent Assertion Entity Activities, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/
(detailing a joint workshop agenda held by the agencies on patent troll activities); FTC Seeks
to Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their Impact on Innovation, Competition, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/09/ftcSeeks-examine-patent-assertion-entities-their-impact (announcing an FTC impact study of patent troll activities as authorized under Section 6(b) of the FTC Act).
12.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND
COMMITMENTS (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/offices/ogc/Final_DOJPTO_Policy_Statement_on_FRAND_SEPs_1-8-13.pdf.
13.
Press Release, White House, FACT SHEET: White House Task Force on High-Tech
Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/factsheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues (recommending or taking steps to, e.g.,
give courts greater discretion to shift fees, mandate disclosure of a patent’s real party-in-interest, tighten functional claiming, and expand the transitional covered business method patent
program); see also Press Release, White House, FACT SHEET—Executive Actions: Answering
the President’s Call to Strengthen Our Patent System and Foster Innovation, (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/02/20/fact-sheet-executive-actions-answering-president-s-call-strengthen-our-p (detailing three additional executive actions to improve
the quality of issued patents by boosting crowdsourcing, patent examiner training, and educational resources for pro se applicants).
14.
See, e.g., Patent Progress’s Guide to Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS,
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-pat
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2013–2014 term, the Supreme Court took a record number of patent cases,15
many addressing priorities articulated by the White House including the
reach of software patents16 the availability of fee-shifting,17 and the clarity of
patent claims.18
But as policymakers take action, they must take into account more than
solely patent hold-up and include consideration of patent “hold-out”: the
practice of companies routinely ignoring patents and resisting patent demands because the odds of getting caught are small.
Patent hold-out is widespread, for both legal and practical reasons.
While the hold-up story is sympathetic to defendants, the hold-out story tells
the plaintiffs’ side. Reconsider the story from before, but now put yourself in
the patentee’s shoes. As an inventor, you had the idea first and wanted to
start a business with it. You tried, without luck, to get the product commercialized successfully, though you did get a patent. You find the technology
being deployed by a large company and approach it to sign a license. The
company ignores you and refuses to engage or license the patent, no matter
how strong it is or reasonable your offer.19 The large company is “holdingout” on your patent demand.
Both hold-up and hold-out theories find fault with the current patent
system, but that is where their similarities end, according to conventional
wisdom. Whereas hold-up theory blames the opportunism of patentholders
for rent-seeking in the patent system, hold-out theory sees the unwillingness
of patent-infringers to entertain legitimate claims as the problem. In addition, whereas the hold-out story implies that patent rights should be strengthened, hold-up proponents believe the opposite—that patent holders are often
ent-reform-legislation/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (summarizing the fourteen anti-troll bills
introduced in the 113th Congress).
15.
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Octane Fitness, LLC. v.
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt.
Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120
(2014); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S.Ct.
1761 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2014) (No. 13–854).
16.
Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (holding 9-0 that generic computer implementations
of abstract ideas to be patent-ineligible); see also Limelight Networks, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014)
(finding, based on a 9-0 decision, that induced infringement requires direct infringement by a
single actor, a ruling with particularly important consequences for internet and network related
claims where different actors may carry out a single process).
17.
See Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756 (allowing courts to shift fees based on a
totality of the circumstances, rather than a rigid test based on a 9-0 decision); Highmark, 134
S. Ct. at 1748 (holding, 9-0, that district court fee decisions are entitled to appellate deference).
18.
See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124 (ruling, 9-0, that patent claims must be reasonably
clear to one of skill in the art in order to be valid).
19.
See Dennis Crouch, Chief Judge Rader: Improving Patent Litigation, PATENTLY-O
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/rader-patent-litigation.html
(describing the related concept of the patent grasshopper that steals technology and “refuses to
pay any license fee until his legs and claws are held to the proverbial litigation fire”).
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overreaching in their accusations and lawsuits.20 The division between these
two camps has created deep schisms within the patent community, patent
judiciary, and patent system at large.21
But considering patent hold-up and patent hold-out perspectives together, rather than either account alone, I argue, reveals a surprising insight—that the solution to hold-up and hold-out may largely be the same: to
reduce the transaction costs, asymmetries, and uncertainty associated with
patent enforcement. The notion that both sets of concerns can be addressed
through a common set of reforms marks a radical departure from the conventional wisdom that hold-up and hold-out views are incompatible with
each other. It is also one that is urgently needed as patent hold-up reforms
have arguably led to more hold-out, by spurring inventors to turn to patent
trolls.
For example, to reduce patent hold-up, advocates have recommended
reforming patent remedies and reducing the number of problematic patents.
Over the past years these recommendations have found favor with the Supreme Court, Federal Circuit,22 and Congress, which have made it harder to
get injunctions and make unsubstantiated damages claims, and easier to invalidate bad patents.23
But instead of getting better, however, the situation has arguably gotten
worse. The smartphone wars have broken out,24 resulting in certain models
being banned from the United States.25 Blockbuster damage awards have
become more, not less, frequent, according to those who track them.26 Per20.
See discussion infra Parts I–II.
21.
See discussion infra Parts I–II.
22.
The Federal Circuit is the court of exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent-law
claims, but not over patent counterclaims. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002).
23.
See discussion infra Part I.
24.
See discussion infra Part I.
25.
Certain smartphone models have been banned as a result of ITC exclusion orders.
See, e.g., Commission Decision, Certain Elec. Devices, Including Wireless Commc’n Devices,
Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, USITC Pub.
34669 (June 10, 2013) (Final) (ordering the exclusion of Apple tablets (iPads) and
smartphones (iPhones) from entry into the United States); Diane Bartz, U.S. ITC Delays Word
on Whether Samsung Infringes Apple’s Patents, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.reuters
.com/article/2013/08/01/us-apple-samsung-patent-idUSBRE9701CI20130801 (describing the
models as the iPhone 4, iPhone 3GS, iPad 3G and iPad 2 3G). This ban was overturned on
August 3, 2013 by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), to whom Presidential veto
authority was delegated. See Letter from Michael B. G. Froman, U.S. Trade Rep., to Irving A.
Williamson, Chairman of the Int’l Trade Comm’n (Aug. 3, 2013) http://www.ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/08032013%20Letter_1.pdf.
26.
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2013),
available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patentlitigation-study.pdf (“Prior to 2012, only three patent infringement damages awards eclipsed
the $1 billion mark. But last year alone, three cases . . . resulted in awards of $1 billion or
greater.”); see also LEX MACHINA, PATENT LITIGATION DAMAGES REPORT i, 5–6 (2014) (reporting increases in total and median damages awards from 2000 to 2013, including from 2010
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haps most worryingly, the share of patent suits filed by patent trolls has
increased, by half of all patent litigation suits or more, according to estimates.27 The most egregious troll suits have opportunistically been brought
against small companies28 and end users who are ill-equipped to play the
expensive “sport of kings” of patent litigation.29 The costs to the economy
have been estimated to be in the tens of billions per year,30 and companies
small and large have reported significant operational impacts—delayed hiring or achievement of other milestones, shifts in business strategy, the closing of business lines (or the entire business), and/or lost valuation,31

to 2013 across damages categories). But see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2014 PATENT
LITIGATION STUDY, 6 Chart 2a (2014), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensicservices/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigation-study.pdf (showing a decline in average median damages awards between 2005–2009 and 2010–2013).
27.
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9, at 3 (In 2012, “[Patent assertion
entities] brought over 2,500 lawsuits—62% of all patent suits.”); Robin Feldman et al., The
AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall
2013, at 1, 7 (finding that 58.7% of 2012 patent litigation cases were filed by patent monetizers); Steve Moore, Probing 10 Patent Troll Myths – A Fractured Fairytale Part 2,
IPWATCHDOG (July 30, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/30/probing10-patent-troll-myths-a-factured-fairytale-part-2/id=43754/ (finding that 45% of cases between
Sept. 17, 2011 and July 30, 2013 were filed by a non-practicing entity); RPX CORP., 2013 NPE
LITIGATION REPORT 4–5 (finding the non-practicing entity (NPE) share of all patent litigation
cases in 2013 to be 63% and, of these cases, 90% were patent assertion entities (PAEs)),
available at http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/RPX-2013-NPE-LitigationReport.pdf. But see General Accounting Office, Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors that
Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent Quality (August 2013),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf (finding that NPEs were responsible
for 20% of suits between 2007 and 2011); Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L.
Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346381, at 7 and Fig. 1 (documenting the impact of changes to the law, and in particular the misjoinder rules, on the rise in
suits from 2010 to 2012, and unpacking PAEs into different types, and finding that though,
collectively, PAEs were “responsible for a majority of accused infringers in 2012,” only 38%
were brought by patent holding companies).
28.
Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 464
(2014).
29.
See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Ed Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being
Sued En Masse for Patent Infringement and What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
235, 235–36 (reporting that out of the top ten PAE campaigns, all involved allegations against
technology end-users or implementers, often to the exclusion of the manufacturer).
30.
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL LAW REV. 387, 387, 408 (estimating that firms lost $29B in direct costs in 2011 due to
patent lawsuits). But see Jay Kesan & David Schwartz, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 425, 433 (2014) (arguing that these
“costs” should be viewed as transfers rather than losses).
31.
See Chien & Reines, supra note 29, at 235 (reporting on small company surveys);
Colleen V. Chien et al., Santa Clara Best Practices in Patent Litigation Survey, 42 AIPLA
Q.J. 137, 166 (2014) [hereinafter Patent Litigation Survey].
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in addition to lost venture capital investment,32 and high acquisitions
costs.33
Hold-out theory explains why some of these developments have happened, in spite of—and arguably, in some cases, because of—the adoption
of many of the cures that hold-up theory has advocated. That patentees have
been “held-out” on explains, in part, why they are increasingly partnering
with patent assertion entities (PAEs), or trolls.34 Juror sympathy to patentholders whose claims are ignored contributes to large damages awards, according to this view.35
A combined view reveals the dangers of adopting either account wholesale and urges recognition of the patent system’s problems that give rise to
both. The high costs of litigating patents leads to hold-up, as small company
defendants cannot afford to pay the legal costs of fighting, as well as holdout, as small company plaintiffs cannot afford to bring enforce their patents
and turn instead to trolls. What is needed, instead, is a way to scale the
transaction costs of enforcing patents in proportion to the economic value of
the patent in order to prevent both rent-seeking by patent-holders and evasive behavior by patent-implementers.
Embracing hold-up and hold-out narratives together reveals surprising
pathways to a better patent system—focused as much on the procedural,
design, and institutional levers for changing the patent system as the doctrinal levers that are the focus of most academic scholarship. These design and
procedural levers include 1) early dispositive rulings, 2) coordination across
courts and agencies, 3) early valuation, and 4) fee- and cost-shifting. Rather
than weakening all component patents, or strengthening all of them, as patent reformers and anti-reformers, respectively, are often accused of trying to
do, these reforms would reduce the transaction costs and asymmetries that
feed both hold-up and hold-out.
32.
Catherine E. Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities
on Entrepreneurial Activity (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Sloan Sch., Working Paper No. 5095-14,
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457611.
33.
For one venture capitalist’s account, see Chien & Reines, supra note 29, at 247–48
(“Because acquisitions often trigger IP lawsuits . . . acquirers are now putting huge indemnifications in the deals, up to the size of the whole deal in several cases we have seen. That means
that the full value of the deal paid to the shareholders of Company X may have to be paid back
if [there is a suit]. . . . Those kinds of clauses will prevent deals from happening, and they also
point to the level of risk that buyers are seeing, which presumably is slowing down the rate at
which they are acquiring small, innovative companies.”). See also Tucker, supra note 32, at 1
(“[L]itigation by frequent patent litigators, a proxy for PAE litigation, is directly associated
with decreased [venture capital] investment.”); Lauren Cohen et al., Patent Trolls: Evidence
from Targeted Firms 22–24 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 15-002, 2014), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464303 (finding that NPEs tend to target companies opportunistically, after the companies have had cash infusions, and documenting these NPE litigations’ negative impact on innovation for these targeted firms)
34.
See discussion infra Parts I & II.
35.
See discussion infra Parts II.
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Part I reviews hold-up theory and how it has fared in practice. Part II
develops hold-out theory and explains how it fills in the gaps that hold-up
theory has left. Part III discusses critiques of each view and examines which
of the two narratives is more compelling. Part IV discusses the implications
and recommendations that follow from a combined view. Part V concludes
with a proposed method of implementing the combined view.
I. PATENT HOLD-UP THEORY
What do patent trolls and the smartphone and standards wars have in
common? All have captured national attention, and all have been blamed on
patent hold-up. Hold-up occurs when a “gap between economic commitments and subsequent commercial negotiations enables one party to capture
part of the fruits of another’s investment.”36 In the patent context, when a
patent is asserted after a product is made, the patentee has the upper hand,
due not to the economic value of the technology, but instead to the high cost
of changing the product to avoid the implicated technology. This hold-up is
made worse when, because of the high cost of patent litigation, the defendant company enters a nuisance-fee based settlement.37 In both situations,
the high transactional costs, of patent litigation and product switching, rather
than the merits of the claim, dictate the outcome of the case. The paragraphs
that follow describe historical and modern contexts and examples of patent
hold-up.
A. The Contexts of Patent Hold-Up
Although patent hold-up has been in the spotlight recently, complaints
about hold-up type abuse are nothing new; a variety of industries, spanning
railroad, automobile, farm equipment, and standardized equipment technologies, have previously confronted similar challenges. This section recounts
several historical and modern episodes involving, for example “patent
sharks,” “avaricious patent agents,” as well as standards and cost of litigation or “nuisance fee” based hold-up.
1. Historical Examples of Patent Hold-Up
Marginal patents were a major problem in the 19th Century.38 One example, from 1835, involved a patent over using coal in a forge. The patent
was issued without any examination, a byproduct of a registration-based pat36.
Joseph Farrel et al., Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603,
603–04 (2007). Patent hold-up is one type of hold-up. For a seminal discussion on hold-ups,
see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 61–63 (1985)
(describing how transacting firms can engage in hold-up when investments are made).
37.
See, e.g., D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their
Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
38.
See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1592 (2009) (describing that many of the
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ent system39 blamed for generating many frivolous or useless patents.40 As a
patent “speculator,” the patentee did not practice the patent on his own but
instead demanded payment from blacksmiths under the simple logic that: “it
will be worthwhile for every blacksmith to give me a couple of dollars for a
right rather than contest it with me.”41 The cost of defense, rather than the
economic value of the patent, dictated the terms of settlement.
Around that time, Pennsylvanians signed a petition that protested the
patent system as being “liable to great abuse, and in itself [being] unjust and
oppressive.”42 Their main concern was a too-readily granted injunction, the
fear of which drove defendants to pay for patent rights rather than “suffer the
injury of stopping their means of livelihood.”43
The common behavior complained about in both cases was the assertion
of patents on a product after it had already been made, and leveraging the
fear of an injunction or lawsuit, rather than the merits of the technology, to
wrest a settlement: in other words, patent hold-up.
History is replete with other complaints about patentee hold-up. In the
late 1800s, for example, patent “sharks” became infamous for using patents
to demand payments from farmers for articles the farmers had purchased.44
The sharks had been able to patent the products of others, but focused their
campaigns on the users of these products.45 In the words of one Congressman, “hundreds, if not thousands” of “unwary and unsuspecting farmers . . .
will no doubt be compelled, by threats and intimidation, either to yield to the
extortionate demands” of patent sharks or “be dragged one hundred and fifty
miles away from their homes, at great inconvenience and expense.”46 Congress held hearings and proposed legislation, and ultimately enacted statuproblems were related to the registration-based, rather than examination-based, system in place
at the time).
39.
In accordance with the first Patent Act of 1793, patents were granted upon registration, rather than examination, of the application. See Edward C. Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, 40 ESSAYS IN HISTORY (1998), available at http://www
.essaysinhistory.com/articles/2012/115.
40.
EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1787–1836 322–31 (Fred B. Rothman ed., 1998).
41.
Id. at 323 fn. 55 (describing the facts of Delano v. Scott, 1 Robb P. C. 700, 7 F. Cas.
378 (E.D. Pa. 1835)).
42.
Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE
932, 941 (1991).
43.
Id.
44.
Earl W. Hayter, The Patent System and Agrarian Discontent, 1875–1888, 34 MISS.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 59, 65–66 (1947). If a manufacturer has not secured all patent rights to
make the product, a user can be sued for their use of the product because patentholders have
the exclusive right to not only make, sell, and import but also to use their invention, making it
possible for customers to get caught in the cross-hairs of battles between patentholders and
manufacturers. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
45.
Hayter, supra note 44. For a more complete exploration of the curious phenomenon
of patent suits against customers, see Chien & Reines, supra note 29.
46.
8 CONG. REC. 1371 (1879).
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tory changes to eliminate certain kinds of patents.47 Other episodes of patent
rent-seeking involve claims brought by “avaricious patent agents” who enforced patents against railroads in the late 1800s and claims involving automobile patents in the early 1900s.48
2. Standards Hold-Up
Over a hundred years later, hold-up theory has been advanced primarily
in the context of standards by prominent law and economics scholars and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).49 Under a typical standards agreement, to
facilitate interoperability, industry participants agree upon a standardized
protocol of deploying a technology, such as connecting to the internet. In
return, holders of patents essential to the standard generally agree to make
their patents available on free or “reasonable and non-discriminatory”
(RAND) terms.50
A kind of super hold-up occurs when a patentholder manages to get its
patent into a standard without making a licensing commitment, or, despite its
commitment, seeks an injunction.51 The late revelation that undisclosed patents are included in the standard can be deliberate or on the part of the
patentholder, and enabled by unclear disclosure policies that facilitate sharp
practices by patentholders.52 When the license sought by the holder of a
47.
Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 346–50
(2012).
48.
See Steven W. Usselman & Richard R. John, Patent Politics: Intellectual Property,
the Railroad Industry, and the Problem of Monopoly, 18 J. POL’Y HIST. 96, 98–99 (2006)
(“Both [farmers and railroads] felt besieged by lawsuits filed by avaricious patent agents—
popularly known as ‘patent sharks’—who demanded, often successfully, sizable payments for
the infringement of patents that patent agents controlled.”); Chien, supra note 47, at 345–46
(describing the railroad patent crisis); see also Merges, supra note 38, at 1592–96.
49.
See, e.g., the references cited herein. For criticisms of hold-up theory, see, e.g., cites
to Brooks, Geradin, Kieff, Spulber, and others infra Part II.
50.
See, e.g., AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ANSI PATENT POLICY 9–10 (2011), available at http://mcsac.fmcsa.dot.gov/Documents/
Aug2011/DOCUMENT_5—
EOBR_Subcommittee_ANSI_Patent_Policy_from_Kraft_MCSAC_FMCSA.pdf (describing
ANSI Essential Requirements § 3.1.1); EUROPEAN TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST. RULES OF
PROCEDURE, Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy (2014), available at http://
www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf; see also Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner &
Jean Tirole, The Rules of Standard-Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis, 38 RAND J.
ECON. 905 (2007).
51.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002).
52.
See, e.g., M. Sean Royall et al., Deterring “Patent Ambush” in Standard Setting:
Lessons from Rambus and Qualcomm, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 36, available at http://
www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Royal-Tessar-DiVincenzo-DeterringPatantAmbush.pdf (describing the alleged deception by patentholders Qualcomm and Rambus
and their assertions that they had not violated “ambiguous” disclosure policies); Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, UTAH
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patent that is truly “essential” to practicing the standard53 far exceeds an
implementer’s expectations, implementing the standard can become prohibitively expensive.54 The particular practice of patentholders emerging with
their demands after the standard has been promulgated has been called “patent ambush.”55 The number of patents implicated by standards can easily
number in the thousands,56 multiplying the risk.
3. Cost and Risk of Defense-Related Hold-Up57
Outside of the standards context, the term “hold-up” has been applied
generally to the leverage that comes, not only from the high cost of changing
a product once it has been made, but also from the high costs and stakes
associated with patent litigation. Losing a patent suit—even over a patent
that the infringer had no knowledge of, and pertaining to a product that it did
not copy from the patentholder, as is the case in most patent suits58—can
mean having to stop selling a product, or paying a sizeable damages award.
But “winning” can be just as financially devastating as losing. Taking a patent case to trial where $25 million or more is at stake costs a median of $5.5
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 28–31), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309023.
53.
Many are not essential. See, e.g., JORGE L. CONTRERAS, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS &
TECH., AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF EX ANTE LICENSING DISCLOSURE POLICIES
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUNTARY TECHNICAL STANDARDS (2011), available at http://
gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/pubs/NISTGCR_11_934.pdf (describing studies that document the
high rates of patents that are non-essential or invalid). See also Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing
FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L. J.
47, 61 (2013) (“[R]ecent studies have found that only 27% and 28% of patent families declared ‘essential’ to ETSI’s GSM and WCDMA standards, respectfully, were actually essential
to implementation of those standards.”).
54.
See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results
and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 163, 173 (2013) (citing the experiences
of standard setting organization VITA with patentholders that disclosed their patents late and
demanded “significantly higher than expected” royalties, in one instance, resulting in a VITA
standard becoming “rendered commercially infeasible”).
55.
Gil Ohana et al., Disclosure and Negotiation of Licensing Terms Prior to Adoption
of Industry Standards: Preventing Another Patent Ambush?, 24 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
644, 645 (2003); Thomas A. Hemphill, Technology Standards Development, Patent Ambush,
and U.S. Antitrust Policy, 27 TECH. IN SOC’Y 55, 57 (2005) (quoting Robert A. Skitol, Remarks Before San Francisco Economic Roundtable: What Should We Call The New Antitrust?
(May 29, 2002), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/10545).
56.
See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup And Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 1992 (2007) (“As a striking example, literally thousands of patents have been
identified as essential to the proposed new standards for 3G cellular telephone systems.”).
57.
See Chien, supra note 47, at 342–44 (describing “patent nuisance fee economics”);
Colleen V. Chien, Presentation to the DOJ/FTC Hearing on PAEs: Patent Assertion Entities
(Dec. 10, 2012) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC Presentation], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314.
58.
Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 1421, 1443 (2009) (finding that copying is not alleged in the vast majority of patent
suits).
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million per side in legal fees,59 and even on a lean budget, fighting a patent
claim costs close to $1 million on average.60 Even before a lawsuit, it is
expensive to determine whether or not a patent is infringed. When the patentee has a large number of patents, the task of determining which ones might
be infringed, by what products, can be an expensive and impossible task.61
Historically, the costs and risks of litigation have been symmetrical, or
at least, shared by both plaintiffs and defendants. However, specialized
PAEs have been able to drive down the risks and costs of bringing patent
cases, in part by asserting broadly worded claims of questionable validity62
against as many as hundreds of defendants at a time.63 When they engage in
little pre-suit investigation and at times even less in the case of customer
suits, if any, defendant-specific diligence,64 “low-end” trolls can cut the cost
of bringing a case. Similar reductions have not been achieved with respect to
the cost of defense. The resulting gap between the cost of defense and cost
of assertion has created compelling patent nuisance fee economics.65

59.
DAVID A. DIVINE & RICHARD W. GOLDSTEIN, AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013 34 (2013).
60.
See Chien, supra note 28, at 472.
61.
See, e.g., Chien, supra note 5, at 308 (describing the analogous challenges companies face accounting for what their patent portfolios contain).
62.
Colleen V. Chien, Turning the Table on Patent Trolls, FORBES, Aug. 9, 2011, http://
www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/08/09/turn-the-tables-on-patent-trolls/ (describing cost
and risk reductions that been achieved by using the same patents to sue large numbers of
defendants, contingency fee schedules, and special purpose assertion entities that reduce the
risk of countersuits); see also, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Costs and Unlicensed Use of
Patented Inventions, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 53, 57–59 (2009) (describing the various user costs of
patent enforcement).
63.
See Chien & Reines, supra note 29, at 236 Table 1 (listing high impact patent campaigns that named hundreds of defendants). For example, PAEs reduce risk by using the same
patents to sue large numbers of defendants in order to achieve economies of scale, contingent
fee lawyers to spread risk, and special purpose assertion entities that are immune to countersuit,. Chien, supra note 62; see also Eisenberg, supra note 62. Section 19(d) of the America
Invents Act limits this practice by requiring joined defendants to have in common the “same
accused product or process.” 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). By one count, the number of average
defendants per NPE case has dropped since then, from an average high of 5.5 in 2010 to 1.4 in
2013. RPX CORP., supra note 27, at Chart 4. Although a growth in the number of cases has
offset this effect, it remains possible to bring cases against large numbers of users of the same
industry product, such as Google Maps.
64.
See Chien, supra note 47, at 342–45 (describing “patent nuisance fee economics”).
Courts have admonished these low-cost tactics in fee-shifting contexts. See, e.g., Findthebest
.com v. Lumen View Tech., LLC, No. 13 Civ. 6521 (DLC) (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2014); Medtrica Solutions LTD. v. Cygnus Med. LLC, No. C12-538RSL (W.D. Wash. July 10, 2014)
(reversing a motion denying attorney’s fees, citing “the absence of evidence supporting theories of infringement”).
65.
Chien, supra note 47, at 340–42.
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Although frequently asserted troll patents overwhelmingly lose at trial,66
most cases never get there. Rather than face the costs of litigation, uncertain
damages or an injunction, or, the potentially unpredictable verdict of a jury,
parties to patent cases regardless of type, generally settle before a merits
resolution.67 However, there is evidence that those who do not practice their
patents are even more likely to resolve prior to an adjudicated judgment.68
B. What is Wrong with the Patent System, According to
Patent Hold-Up Theory
Across these contexts, three ingredients of patent hold-up consistently
have been identified: opportunistic ex post assertion, “bad” patents, and remedies that create opportunities for rent-seeking. As discussed in this section,
each has been the target of patent reform efforts.
1. Ex Post Assertions
According to hold-up theory, whether in the form of patent “ambush,”
or patent trolling, the problem with patent hold-up is the timing of the assertion. By pursuing a patent license ex post, after a product has been created,
rather than ex ante, at the time the product is being designed, the patent
owner can leverage not only the economic value of the invention, but also
the cost of changing the product.69
The cost of changing the product can vary substantially—a software upgrade that disables an infringing functionality of minor importance, for example, may be considerably less expensive to implement than a change that
for example, requires real estate on a circuit board to be reallocated or
changes to a product’s supply chain. Regardless, in the ex post period, impacts to operational, customer, and partner commitments not present in the
66.
John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 708 (2011) (reporting a win rate of 9.2% among frequently asserted
non-practicing entity patents).
67.
See John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation,
92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 1780 (2014) (finding that less than ten percent of suits filed in 2008 and
2009 resulted in a merits decision).
68.
CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2014 PATENT LITIGATION
STUDY 2 (2014), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/
assets/2014-patent-litigation-study.pdf (citing the disproportionately small percentage of court
decisions in 2013 involving non-practicing entity (NPE) plaintiffs—20%, compared to a
higher filing rate, “reflecting the higher tendency for NPE-filed cases to settle or be dismissed”). “Non-practicing entity” is a term that is widely understood to include not only PAEs,
those entities whose primary business is to assert patents, but also universities, independent
inventors, and others who do not practice their patents but do not derive a majority of their
revenue from patent assertion.
69.
See FTC, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8, 50 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-re
port-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf.
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design phase will often need to be taken into account. Thus, the incentive to
settle is driven by the desire to avoid switching costs, rather than the inherent value of the technology. Accordingly, patentholders have rich incentives
to wait to bring their claims after a product has been developed and successfully marketed.
2. Bad Patents
According to its detractors, hold-up is also made possible by “bad patents”—patents that are marginal, overbroad, or over-asserted. If a product or
standard incorporates thousands of patents, there exists a greater chance each
single patent represents only a marginal technological advance.70 According
to the economics of patent assertion entities described above, the best patents for economic exploitation are the ones that appear to be practiced by the
largest number of defendants, and are therefore more likely to be broad, or
otherwise “functionally claimed.”71 In some cases, the problem is not overbreadth but over assertion: when patent plaintiffs “distort a patent claim far
beyond its plain meaning and precedent for the apparent purpose of raising
the legal costs of the defense.”72
Complaints from the technical community deeming software patents, in
particular, to be “junk,” are rife.73 Calls for reforming marginal patents range

70.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards
(and One Not to), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 150 (2007) (“[I]n the IT industries, there are usually
multiple patents—sometimes hundreds or even thousands—on each new product.”).
71.
See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 908 (2013).
72.
Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Op-Ed., Make Patent Trolls
Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/makepatent-trolls-pay-in-court.html.
73.
See, e.g., Brad Burnham, Software Patents are the Problem Not the Answer, UNION
SQUARE VENTURES (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.usv.com/2010/02/software-patents-are-theproblem-not-the-answer.php; Robert Purvy, Software Obviousness: The Disconnect Between
Engineers and the Patent System 1 (Feb. 17, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=2399580 (“Software engineers overwhelmingly dislike software patents and consider
nearly all of them obvious.”). In 1994, at hearings held by the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO), most programmers who testified about software patents testified against them. Public
Hearing on Use of the Patent System to Protect Software-Related Inventions, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE (Feb. 10–11, 1994), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/
software/arlington/vahrng.pdf. See also the related testimony of USPTO Commissioner Bruce
Lehmann: “There is no question about it that the lawyers Seem to [be] very much in favor of
patent protection. Companies tend to be somewhat split, and programmers who’ve testified,
though not all, a majority of them have testified against it.” Public Hearing on Use of the
Patent System to Protect Software-Related Inventions, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE 91
(Jan. 26–27, 1994), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/sanjose/sjhrng
.pdf.
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from the polite to the adamant: 1) make them better,74 2) invalidate them,75
3) abolish them,76 and 4) abolish the patent system.77 As the reach of patent
assertions has extended beyond the industries most traditionally invested the
patent system (i.e. tech and pharma), encompassing “Main Street” entities
like retailers, the auto industry, the lodging industry, small businesses, and
startups,78 mainstream scrutiny of the patent system and its impacts, even by
late night comedians and celebrities, has also intensified.79
3. Disproportionate Remedies
Another source of hold-up, according to theories about it, is remedies
that are out of proportion with the “crime” of component infringement.80
Patents confer the right to exclude, but if a patent covers only a small part of
a big product, should the entire product be enjoined? In that case,81 or when
redesign would be really expensive, advocates say no.82 Outsized damages—
those that award a percentage of revenue based on one of perhaps hundreds
of thousands of patents—are also to blame. When multiple royalties are
sought, the result can be a total royalty rate that exceeds the entire revenue
associated with the product, a phenomenon known as royalty stacking.83
74.
Most often, by increasing examination resources. See, e.g., Chien, supra note 47, at
353 (describing the extra scrutiny that have been applied to business method patent applications through the second pair of eyes review).
75.
For example, once they have issued, through various post-grant review options, described infra note 206.
76.
Vivek Wadhwa, Why We Need To Abolish Software Patents, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 7,
2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/07/why-we-need-to-abolish-software-patents/.
77.
Boldrin & Levine, supra note 8.
78.
Colleen V. Chien, Patent Trolls By The Numbers, PATENTLY-O (March 14, 2013),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-trolls.html (citing data indicating that
more non-tech companies than tech companies were sued by patent trolls in 2012); see also
Letter from the Auto. Mfrs., Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n, Nat’l Retail Fed’n Am., Ass’n of
Adver. Agencies, Am. Bankers Ass’n, Am. Gaming Ass’n, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Am. Hotel &
Lodging Ass’n (July 17, 2013), available at http://www.patentprogress.org/documents/bigtent-letter-to-congress/.
79.
See, e.g., The Colbert Report: Amazon’s Audacious Photography Patent (Comedy
Central television broadcast Mar. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Colbert Report], available at http://
thecolbertreport.cc.com/videos/4a4ahs/amazon-s-audacious-photography-patent; Angelina
Jolie, Op-Ed., My Medical Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
05/14/opinion/my-medical-choice.html; Sandra Park, Joan Reinhardt-Reiss & Judith Wallace,
Letter to the Editor, Angelina Jolie’s Decision: More Perspectives, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/opinion/angelina-jolies-decision-more-perspectives.html (letters to the editor in response to Angelina Jolie’s editorial in the New York
Times, calling attention to the price of breast cancer screening tests, alleged to be enabled by
the patents held by the company Myriad Genetics); When Patents Attack!, THIS AM. LIFE (July
22, 2011), available at http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/ (an early
report by the mainstream media on the patent system).
80.
See Lemley, supra note 70, at 165–66.
81.
See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 2036.
82.
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 2037–39.
83.
See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 2011–14.
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C. The Uptake of Patent Hold-Up: Cautions and Cures
Concerns about patent hold-up have been influential among those making policy and legal decisions at the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and
Congress. When the Supreme Court decided its landmark eBay v.
MercExchange decision, Justice Kennedy specifically cited in his concurrence “injunction[s] . . . employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant
fees,” by firms that use patents “not as a basis for producing and selling
goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”84 The decision
made it harder for those asserting exclusionary patent rights to get injunctions, reducing the odds of getting one from about 95% to about 75%, and
much less, when requested by a patent assertion entity.85 The Federal Circuit
has further limited the availability of injunctive relief in certain component
patent cases.86 The district courts have also been reluctant to enjoin products
based on the assertion of standards essential patents.87
The Federal Circuit, under the leadership of then-Chief Judge Randall
Rader, also changed damages laws to address hold-up concerns. One casualty has been the so-called “25% rule,” under which courts would assign
damages based on the assumption that an infringed patent was worth 25% of
the value of the product. Now, it is no longer appropriate for a court to apply
this default to assign a single patent, which may represent just one of
thousands of patents, to use the rule to assign a quarter of the value of the
product to the patent without some scientifically justified basis for doing
so.88 When royalty rates are calculated based on looking at the royalty rates
in like circumstances, they really must be like circumstances.89 Awards must
be tethered to “economic reality.”90
Finally, policymakers have taken on the “bad patents” that, according to
some, fuel hold-up. Over the years, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) has put greater scrutiny on patent applications over certain
types of inventions at the examination stage.91 Implementing a White House
84.
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
85.
Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, The ITC, and the Public
Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–10, fig. 1 (2012).
86.
See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 695 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(specifying that in component cases, patentees must prove that the infringement caused the
alleged harm, or a so-called “causal nexus”).
87.
See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.
88.
See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(rejecting the 25% rule).
89.
See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(holding that the plaintiff cannot justify a jury’s lump sum award by providing evidence of
other licenses that do not give lump sums).
90.
See Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 33 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(finding the district court’s royalty rate “out of line with economic reality”).
91.
Through the “second pair of eyes” review process described, e.g., in Michael J.
Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 676 (2009).
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executive action, the USPTO has issued new guidelines that increase scrutiny of functional claims.92 Congress has made it easier to challenge a patent’s validity once it has issued from the Patent Office. The America Invents
Act (AIA) created “inter partes review,” which “allows patents to be challenged on several grounds of invalidity, without the deference to the patent
that applies in courts.”93 Business method patents have also been subject to
more searching review under the “Covered Business Method Patent” program.94 In the first year, approximately 485 petitions for inter partes review
were filed at the Patent Office,95 as compared to 53 requests in the first five
years of inter partes reexamination, the pre-AIA counterpart to inter partes
review.96
D. Despite Attempts to Limit Patent Hold-Up,
Hold-Up Has Apparently Worsened
With all of these policy-shaping developments, one might think that patent hold-up is on the wane. But hold-up is arguably worse, not better. In the
eight years since the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, an industry has developed around the types of companies about which Justice Kennedy expressed concern. Patent trolls, according to public perception, wait until the
technology has been developed and commercialized in order to get the greatest royalties based on their assertions.97 There are at least fifteen publicly
traded companies whose business model is primarily the assertion of pat92.
These new guidelines are posted on http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/exam
guide.jsp. See, e.g., USPTO, 35 USC 112 (f): Identifying Limitations that Invoke 112(f) (Aug.
2, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/112f_identifying_limitations.pptx; USPTO,
35 USC 112, Sixth Paragraph, for Pre-AIA Applications Filed Before 9/16/12: Identifying a
Means-Plus-Function Limitation (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/
112f_identifying_limitations.pdf; USPTO, 35 USC § 112 (f): Making the Record Clear (Aug.
2, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/112f_making_record_clear.pptx; USPTO,
35 USC 112, Sixth Paragraph for Pre-AIA Applications Filed Before 9/16/12: Making the
Record Clear for Means-Plus-Function Claims (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/
law/exam/112f_making_record_clear.pdf.
93.
See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History Of The America Invents Act: Part
II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 598–605 (2012) (summarizing the history and rationale behind
inter partes review).
94.
The Covered Business Method transitional program allows petitioners to challenge
the validity of financial services data processing patents used in the practice, administration, or
management of a financial product on all bases of patent validity. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112–29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 284 (2011).
95.
See 3 Harnessing Patent Office Litigation, HARNESS, DICKEY & PIERCE, PLC (last
visited Sept. 14, 2014), http://ipr-pgr.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/IPR-PGR-Report-Vol.3.pdf.
96.
Matal, supra note 93, at 599 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 46, 48 (2011)).
97.
See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent
Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309,
1317 (2013).
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ents.98 PAEs have brought an increasing number and share of patent suits.
The White House, using data from patent defense company Rational Patent
Corporation (RPX), estimated that PAEs were responsible for approximately
62% of all suits in 2012;99 others have pegged the share of patent monetization suits at closer to 58%100 or 45%.101
Likewise, despite the evolution of the damages case law, it is not yet
clear what will happen to damages awards. Indeed, juries continue to make
record awards.102 It may be that the evolution of damages law and operationalization of a higher standard of proof recently imposed by the Federal Circuit will take time for the market, and courts, to react to. But it may also be
that, as described later in this Article,103 policy discussions of patent hold-up
and apportionment are falling on deaf (jury) ears.
Finally, the smartphone wars—between companies like Apple, Samsung, HTC, and many others—have further bloodied the waters. The number
of smartphone suits has reportedly quadrupled, from 24 to 103, since eBay
was decided.104 Products deemed to be infringing have been banned as a
result.105
Thus, according to one account, hold-up theory has described and perhaps even predicted an important set of problems. But it has faltered in providing solutions to them. What is hold-up theory missing? The answer lies,
in part, in the other side of the story: patent hold-out.
98.
Chien, supra note 78.
99.
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9.
100.
Feldman et al., supra note 27, at 7.
101.
Based on an analysis of 425 cases chosen at random filed between Sept. 17, 2011
and July 30, 2013. Moore, supra note 27; see also Cotropia, Kesan, & Schwartz, supra note 27
(finding that large aggregators and patent holding companies brought 44% of cases in 2012;
adding individuals brought the total to 52%). The GAO’s study of patent litigation trends cited
supra note 27 did not include data from 2012.
102.
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2013),
available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patentlitigation-study.pdf (reporting on the award of three $1B+ jury verdicts in 2012, as many as
had ever been awarded previously; all were subsequently reduced); see also LEX MACHINA,
supra note 26, at Fig. 7 (showing increases in median damages awards from 2010–2013 but
unevenness in year-to-year trends).
103.
See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
104.
See, e.g., Chris O’Brien, Apple, Samsung To Return To Court In High-Stakes Patent
Case, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/05/business/la-fismartphone-patent-war-20121206 (describing the quadrupling of smartphone-related patent
suits from 2006, when eBay was decided, to 2011); see also David J. Kappos, Investing In
America’s Future Through Innovation: How The Debate Over The Smart Phone Patent Wars
(Re)Raises Issues At The Foundation Of Long-Term Incentive Systems, 16 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 485 (2013) (comparing the smartphone wars to other historic patent battles).
105.
See, e.g., Certain Personal Data and Mobile Communications Devices and Related
Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. 4,331 (Dec. 19, 2011) (Final) (banning HTC
smartphones from the U.S.); 337-TA-794, supra note 25 (banning iPhones from the U.S.). The
later ban was subsequently vetoed by the President. Letter from Michael B. G. Froman to
Irving A. Williamson, supra note 25.
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II. PATENT HOLD-OUT THEORY
While policymakers and academics have embraced the concept of patent
hold-up, the patent system is administered by judges and juries. There, litigants before them tell a different story:
“I could not commercialize my invention alone, but the financial institutions I needed to partner with largely ignored me when I approached them
with my invention. They were able to adopt my invention without me, and
ignore my protests, because they knew I lacked the resources to take them to
court and stop them.”106
This familiar story107 describes what I call patent “hold-out”108—the
practice of companies ignoring patents and patent demands because the high
costs of enforcing patents makes prosecution unlikely—or, in other words,
because they can get away with it.
Each of these phenomena—the practice of companies ignoring hightech patents, the high costs of detection and enforcement, in some cases,
relative to the value of the invention, and the under-enforcement of patents—has been observed and documented but in isolation. As I describe below, together, they create a cohesive theory of patent hold-out that provides
an alternative explanation for the dysfunctions of the patent system. In the
paragraphs that follow, I describe examples and contexts of hold-out.
A. The Contexts of Patent Hold-Out
Although arguably undertheorized, the challenges associated with enforcing patents have generated policy concern intermittently, primarily due
to the cost of litigation. Because patent defendants, like other defendants in
our civil justice system, are “innocent until proven guilty,” which requires
showing that the patent sought to be enforced is both valid and infringed, the
status quo disfavors patent plaintiffs.
1. Early Concerns About Patent Hold-Out
Patent hold-out and the challenges associated with enforcing patents
have generated policy concern for decades. When introducing his agenda for
patent reform in the 1960s, President Lyndon B. Johnson cited the fact that,
106.
Letter from Paul Ryan, Chairman and CEO of Acacia Research Corp., to Fed. Trade
Comm’n (May 13, 2009) (on file with the Federal Trade Commission), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/policy/public-comments/comment-540872-00048.
107.
Change financial institution to automobile industry, for example, and you have the
plotline for “Flash of Genius,” the only full-length movie centered on the patent system of
which the author is aware. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, The Individual Inventor Motif in
the Age of Patent Trolls, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 52 (2009).
108.
This term has also been used to refer, in the standards context, to patentees who do
not submit their patents to standards body; see Douglas Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the
Standard-Setting Process (U. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 292, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902646.
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“the inventor is often faced with time consuming, costly and unnecessary
legal action to enforce his rights”109 as a key motivation. In 1990, the ABA
passed a resolution favoring the creation of low-cost, small claims patent
and copyright enforcement proceedings.110 This move was motivated by the
perception that increases in the cost of litigation “effectively shut out [claimants] from the federal courts,”111 in particular inventors with limited damages claims.112 Although the proposal did not get traction at the time, in 2012
the USPTO issued a request for comments on the need for a small claims
court.113
2. Reverse Patent Hold-Up
Within the patent standards context, patentholders have also worried
about receiving less than they deserve. While hold-up worries about
patentholders wielding undue leverage, hold-out is concerned with the opposite—that implementers (most often manufacturers) wield undue leverage,
allowing them to use standards-essential patents and not pay for them. For
example a manufacturer may argue that they do not need a license to a patent because the patent is invalid or non-infringed, or because the patent does
not actually read on the standard, as implemented by the manufacturer.114
The manufacturer may also use the technology without paying, “under the
guise that the patent owner’s offers to license were not fair or reasonable.”115
The patent owner is therefore forced to defend her rights through expen-

109.
Letter from Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, to Hubert H.
Humphrey, President of the Senate, and John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House, Transmitting a Proposal To Modernize the Patent System (Feb. 21, 1967) (on file with The American Presidency Project), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28655 (listing
patent quality, the time and expense of getting and enforcing patents, and the speed of disclosure as priorities).
110.
A.B.A. Res. 401-4, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. COMM.
REP. 194. See also Request for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the United
States, 77 Fed. Reg. 74830-31 (Dec. 18, 2012), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/
articles/2012/12/18/2012-30483/request-for-comments-on-a-patent-small-claims-proceedingin-the-united-states (2012 USPTO request for comments as to whether the United States
should develop a small claims proceeding for patent enforcement).
111.
A.B.A. Res. 401-4, supra note 110, at 194–95.
112.
Request for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding, supra note 110.
113.
A.B.A. Res. 401-4, supra note 110, at 194–95.
114.
See Damien Geradin, Reverse Hold-Ups: The (Often Ignored) Risks Faced By Innovators In Standardized Areas, in THE PROS AND CONS OF STANDARD SETTING 101, 102–04
(2010), available at http://www.kkv.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/Pros&Cons/
rap_pros_and_Cons_standard_setting.pdf.
115.
Certain Elec. Devices, Including Wireless Commc’n Devices, Portable Music &
Data Processing Devices, & Tablet Computers, Inv. No. 337-TA-794, Commission Opinion,
63 (July 5, 2013), available at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf4/SamsungvApple-ITC-Opinion
.pdf.
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sive litigation.116 Manufacturers who behave this way are accused of engaging in reverse hold-up, a species of patent hold-out.117
3. Juror Sympathy and Patent Hold-Out
Juries are also perceived to be sympathetic towards patentees, and the
road they must take to enforce their patents. Juries are more likely than
judges to find for the patentee,118 less likely to overturn the patent office’s
decision to grant a patent,119 and more likely to award greater damages
though the reasons why that is the case are unclear120 Among patentee
groups, the fewer the inventors, the more likely a patentee is to win, suggesting that juries empathize most with the plight of the individual
inventor.121
This apparent pro-plaintiff bias extends to concerns about patent holdout. In mock experiments, jurors have been known to “fret that the patentee
has had to wait years to recover its damages, and they often ratchet the
damages award upward to compensate.”122 Mark Lemley has noted that
courts do this too, in effect adding prohibited multipliers or “kickers” to

116.
See, e.g., id.
117.
Id. (“In reverse patent hold-up, an implementer utilizes declared-essential technology without compensation to the patent owner under the guise that the patent owner’s offers to
license were not fair or reasonable. The patent owner is therefore forced to defend its rights
through expensive litigation. In the meantime, the patent owner is deprived of the exclusionary
remedy that should normally flow when a party refuses to pay for the use of a patented
invention.”)
118.
Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 107–08 (2007)
(finding jury v. bench trial patentee success rates of ~65% vs. ~52%, based on an analysis of
all federal district court patent trials between 1990 and 2003); see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2010 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: THE CONTINUED EVOLUTION OF
PATENT DAMAGES LAW 15 (2010) (finding jury v. bench trial patentee success rates of ~80%
vs. ~53%).
119.
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 212–13 (1998) (finding a jury v. bench patent validity rate of
67.1% vs. 57.3%).
120.
While a direct comparison is difficult, due to selection bias and the impact of outlier
jury demands, several reports have documented differences in award amounts. Compare
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—an Empirical Peek Inside the Black
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 395 (2000) (“Judges make damage awards in excess of $5 million
in 17% of the cases, and juries award them in 21%.”) with Michael J. Mazzeo et al., Explaining the “Unpredictable”: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Patent Infringement Awards, 35 INT’L
REV. L & ECON. 58, 68 (2013) (finding the amount expected to be awarded by a jury trial to be
2.8 to 29.9 times that of an award by a judge, with an estimated effect of 9.2 times, but also
concluding that “this does not prove that juries cause awards to be higher, all else equal”).
121.
Moore, supra note 118, at 107–08 (based on a regression analysis of approximately
two-thousand patent trials litigated between 1990 and 2003).
122.
Martha K. Gooding & William C. Rooklidge, The Real Problem with Patent Infringement Damages, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 484, 487 (2009).
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damages awards because of a sense of “perceived unfairness” in the law’s
approach to calculating damages.123
Despite instructions that tell jurors that they should award damages in
order to compensate, not punish, jurors at times instinctively punish hold-out
behavior. In the words of one mock juror: “[the defendant] had the option to
license the patent and didn’t, so now we are in punitive damages . . . and
they have to feel the wrath.”124 Though the mock juror does not say the
phrase “hold-out,” to the juror the consequences are clear: the manufacturer
must now be punished for his refusal to license, or in other words, his “holdout,” during the negotiation phase.
B. What’s Wrong with the Patent System, According to
Patent Hold-Out Theory
At their root, these diverse accounts—of small entities shut out of the
enforcement process, standards implementers refusing to pay for their use of
patents, and the natural sympathy of juries to inventors who are held-out on
—are based on the same core set of problems with the patent system. These
include shirking by infringers, the risks that patentees have to endure to enforce their patents, and the cost of enforcement. As described below, invoking patent hold-out to explain each ailment of the patent system provides an
alternative explanation and rebuttal to patent hold-up models: it is the ex
ante shirking, not ex post assertions, of patentholders; risky, not bad patents;
and disproportionate enforcement costs, not remedies, that are to blame.
1. Ex Ante Shirking (Not Ex Post Assertions)
The problem with hold-up assertions, according to patent hold-up theory, is that they take place ex post, after the product has already been commercialized and irreversible investments made. Indeed, that is the typical
troll story: a patentholder lies in wait, launching a surprise attack when a
company tries to implement a patent. But patent hold-out theory explains the
timing of these demands—that patentholders must resort to ex post assertions because manufacturers ignore ex ante demands. In many cases, manufacturers fail to take steps to clear products prior to their release even though
they are arguably in the best position to determine whether any patents read
on their plans.125 The troll is not lying in wait, but rather helping an inventor
who is languishing, having repeatedly asked for a licensing agreement, and
having repeatedly been rebuffed.
123.
Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits and Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 655, 662, 666 (2009).
124.
Gooding & Rooklidge, supra note 122, at 486.
125.
I am thankful to Michael Risch for making this point to me.
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The phenomenon of companies ignoring high-tech patents is well documented.126 From a potential defendant’s perspective, the concerns are practical—reading the patents of others results in a manufacturer knowing about a
patent, and knowledge of a patent makes it easier for a court to enhance a
damages award based on a defendant’s knowing infringement.127 Companies
are often counseled not to respond to or accept unsolicited offers to license
or buy patents,128 knowing that engaging with the patentholder can often
result in legal or settlement costs.129 Since only 1–2% of all enforceable
patents are actually litigated,130 it may be better for a potential infringer to
take his chances.
From the patentee’s perspective, though, when companies resist patent
demands, they shirk their responsibilities as willing participants in the patent
economy. In accordance with one inventor’s account: “[The cost of pursuing
a patent case] makes such litigation almost impossible for the inventor and
small businessperson. . . . [Large companies] recognized that inventors and
small companies could not afford to bring suit to enforce their patents, and
so they did not respect their patents.”131 From this perspective, the relative
size of the infringer as compared to the patentee, not the merits of the claim,
dictate the outcome—that companies, especially big companies, hold-out,
and resist legitimate claims for compensation.
2. Risky (Not Bad) Patents
Hold-out theory also finds fault, not with patents themselves, but with
the risks that are required to enforce them. When a patent is asserted, there is
a risk it will be challenged and ultimately invalidated. A court can knock out
a patent on a variety of statutory bases—that the invention does not claim
protectable subject matter,132 the patent is not enabled by the specification,133
126.
See, e.g., FTC, supra note 69, at 9–10 (documenting, through scores of testimony,
that patent problems in the information technology (IT) sector have often “[led] firms to abandon patent ‘clearance’ efforts”); see also Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90
TEX. L. REV. 283, 289–92 (2011); Mark Lemley, Ignoring Patents, in THE FUTURE OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM 79, 80 (Ryo Shimanami ed. 2012).
127.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2014); In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(holding that to establish willful infringement, a patentee must show that the infringer acted
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent
and that this objectively-defined risk was either known or so obvious that it should have been
known).
128.
Technology Development Companies and Individual Inventors, IPNAV, http://www
.ipnav.com/client-categories/inventors/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
129.
Colleen V. Chien & Stefani E. Shanberg, 10 Ways Startups Can Deal with Patent
Troll Demands, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 7, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/07/10-ways-startups-can-deal-with-patent-troll-demands/.
130.
Chien, supra note 126, at 283.
131.
Testimonials, ACACIA RESEARCH GROUP LLC, http://acaciatechnologies.com/testi
monials.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
132.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
133.
Id. § 112.
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or that the patent disclosure fails to adequately describe the invention,134 for
example.135 Even if the patent is valid, the patent may not be infringed—if
the terms are not interpreted “just so,” the contested behavior will not be
covered.136
The patentee can survive the battle and still lose the war. A patentee
may spend millions of dollars enforcing a patent, only to have it invalidated
by a challenge at the USPTO, such as inter partes review, which ironically is
provoked by the litigation.137 Large jury verdicts are often reduced,138 and
claims are re-interpreted on appeal against the plaintiff about a third of the
time, and even more often with respect to high-tech patents.139 Even after a
license agreement is secured, the licensee can challenge the patents.140
It is for all of these reasons, some argue, that patentees need big wins: to
make up for the failures.141 Indeed, patents are perceived as risky assets,142
heavily discounted in debt transactions.143
3. Disproportionate Litigation Costs
(Not Disproportionate Remedies)
According to patent hold-up theory, what fuels patent abuses are outsized remedies. But patent hold-out finds fault in the high costs of litigation,
relative to the value of the case—that is, it costs more to bring a suit than the
suit is worth. The problem is, in other words, disproportionate litigation
costs, not disproportionate remedies.
Disproportionate costs are particularly problematic for low-value disputes. According to the 2013 AIPLA Annual Economic Survey, summarized
134.
135.

Id.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 504, 507–09 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
136.
Claim terms are interpreted through a process called “claim construction.” See id. at
507–08.
137.
See, e.g., Financing Patent Monetization, IPNAV (Nov. 2012), http://www.ipnav
.com/resource-center/ideas-and-insights/financing-patent-monetization/. The majority of inter
partes reviews have been filed on patents that are also in litigation. See, e.g., RPX CORP.,
supra note 27, at 41 (reporting data showing that 70–97% of patents subject to an IPR were
also the subject of district court litigation).
138.
See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 102, at 3 (reporting on the reduction of several high-dollar jury awards in 2012).
139.
Christopher A. Cotropia, Is Patent Claim Interpretation Review Deference or Correction Driven?, 2014 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2265962 (reporting that these findings, for the patentee, are overturned more often than findings for the defendant).
140.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 135–37 (2007).
141.
I am thankful to Michael Risch for making this point to me.
142.
Joseph W. Jennings, IP Debt—The New Monetisation Option, INTELL. ASSET
MGMT. MAG., May–June 2014, at 41, 46, available at http://www.ipnav.com/linkservid/C3415
33B-5056-9000-0331C4401FA78344/.
143.
Id. at 41.
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in Figure 1, below,144 when less than $1 million is at risk, it costs $916,000,
on average, per side, to litigate a matter through trial.145 This means that
many cases cost more to litigate than they are worth. Litigation becomes
even more unaffordable when both sides’ costs are factored in. As the value
of the case goes up, the proportion of costs decreases. For example, when
more than $25 million is at risk, the average cost of $6 million per party is a
fraction of the reward,146 making the problem of disproportionate costs fall,
well, disproportionately, on smaller disputes.
FIGURE 1. COST

TO

LITIGATE A PATENT CASE, AS PERCENTAGE
AMOUNT AT STAKE

III. WHICH THEORY—PATENT HOLD-UP
PATENT HOLD-OUT—IS RIGHT?

OF

OR

So, in sum, if the hold-up account of the world is to be believed, the
problem is this: patent holders waiting to opportunistically sue, on the basis
of patents of questionable validity, after irreversible investments have been
144.
Colleen V. Chien & Michael J. Guo, Does the US Patent Need a Patent Small
Claims Proceeding? 2 fig.2 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-13,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2249896, updated with
the 2013 figures described id. Calculations are based on mean costs and average case values,
e.g., $500,000 for the up to $1 million range, $12.5 million for the $1–$25 million range, and
$50 million for the greater than $25 million range. These cost estimates are for one party in a
one-patent lawsuit, assuming non-contingent representation.
145.
AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY I-129–I-132 (2013). The 2013 AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey
shows that the average cost of a patent infringement suit where less than $1 million are at risk
is $530,000 through the end of discovery and $968,000 inclusive of all costs. Where $1–$10
million are at risk, the average patent infringement suit costs $1.2 million through the end of
discovery and $2.1 million inclusive of all costs. Where $11–$25 million are at risk, the average patent infringement suit costs $2.2 million through the end of discovery and $3.6 million
inclusive of all costs. Where more than $25 million are at risk, a patent infringement suit costs
$3.6 million through the end of discovery and $5.9 million inclusive of all costs.
146.
Id.
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made, wielding the threat of a lengthy and expensive lawsuit or the prospect
of having to change their product. The hold-out version of the truth, in contrast, looks almost like the opposite: patent infringers ignoring and waiting
out even the most reasonable offers to engage in licensing discussions, leaving patent holders with no choice but to risk everything and file suit and
spend exorbitant sums just for the privilege to vindicate their statutory
rights. Which account is right?
As with most things, the truth lies somewhere in between these two
accounts. In this Part, I explore the counterarguments and available evidence
behind each theory to determine when each narrative is most useful in considering patent policy.
A. Critiquing Patent Hold-Out
Despite its instinctive appeal, accounts of patent hold-out are susceptible
to at least two critiques. First, hold-out does not fully account for all the
costs involved in the patent transaction, and under-enforcement may be good
for the overall economy. Second, even if patent hold-out is a real problem,
PAEs are not the best way to address the issue.
1. Patent Non-Enforcement Rewards Independent Invention and is Good
for Consumers and Competition
Although the hold-out story is compelling on a personal level, the social
calculus must also include transaction and information costs. According to
some, the under-enforcement of patents in certain sectors is actually a good
thing, because it “shelters” follow-on innovation from the costs of licensing
and risks of liability.147 Although this view may seem shortsighted, sustained
innovation in information technology, despite the norm of patent acquisition
and non-enforcement,148 seems to belie such a characterization. Making the
converse point, in technology sectors, patent enforcement has been accused
of undercutting the “permissionless innovation”149 credited with fueling internet-based economic growth.150
Additionally, the hold-out story assumes that inventors should get the
full benefit of their inventions—a reasonable conclusion to draw from the
147.
Eisenberg, supra note 62, at 59 (“The costs of the patent system provide shelter for
infringing behavior that might otherwise lead to either licensing or liability, perhaps mitigating
excesses in the patent system while retaining strong rights that motivated owners may
enforce.”).
148.
However, some of this non-enforcement may be due to tacit (through forbearance
from enforcement due to the target’s possession of patents that the patentee also may be infringing, or patent détente) or explicit (through cross-licensing) technology sharing facilitated
by patents. See Chien, supra note 5, at 321.
149.
Burnham, supra note 73.
150.
Vinton Cerf, Op-Ed., Keep the Internet Open, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/opinion/keep-the-internet-open.html (discussing “permissionless innovation”).
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statutory right to exclude.151 But such a result would be a social disaster.
Consumers and other producers should, and do, share in the benefits—according to one estimate, innovators capture, on average, only 2.2% of the
total value of their innovations, other producers and consumers enjoy the
rest.152 One critique of patent hold-out, thus, may be that while some patent
protection and return to inventors are good things, more protection—for example, that result in a 100% return to patentees—is not necessarily better.
Instead of maximizing patentee returns, the focus should be on maximizing
total social returns.153
In addition, non-enforcement of patents rewards independent invention—as Mark Lemley and Chris Cotropia have found, copying is rarely
alleged in software patents cases.154 Applying this lens, “holding out” is not
refusing to pay for something taken, but refusing to pay when, after you
yourself have created something, someone claims that it was theirs to begin
with.
Still, it is hard to know how to strike the right balance. The hold-out
story is broadly consistent with aspects of other theories used to calibrate
innovation incentives. For example, as David Teece has famously theorized,
a lack of complimentary assets makes it harder for innovators to appropriate
the value of their technologies.155 The Schumpeterian view that perfect competition provides inadequate incentives to innovate, argues in favor of government inventions like intellectual property.156 The ability of patents to
offset some of the advantages of incumbents and increase the odds of success for entrants is evidenced by the large share of venture capitalists that
believe patents are important for innovation.157 However, given how incremental and even, perhaps, obvious158 advances are in high-tech, it is also
likely that many patented innovations would have happened anyway.159
151.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
152.
William D. Nordhaus, Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and
Measurement 22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10433, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10433.
153.
This argument is advanced, for example, in Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1046–69 (2005).
154.
Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 58, at 1445–46 (2009) (finding that only 3% of
software cases are filed with allegations of copying).
155.
David J. Teece, Profiting From Technological Innovation: Implications For Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 288–90 (1986).
156.
See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 131–34 (4th
ed. 1954).
157.
See COLLEEN V. CHIEN, NEW AM. FOUND., PATENT ASSERTION AND STARTUP INNOVATION 19 fig. 4 (2013), available at http://newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Patent%20Assertion%20and%20Startup%20Innovation_updated.pdf (reporting that
70% of 42 surveyed venture capitalists agreed with the statement that patents “agreed” or
“strongly agreed” with the assertion that “patents are vital to innovation in my industry”).
158.
As alleged by many in the software community, see Purvy, supra note 73, at 1.
159.
See Mark Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 711
(2012); accord Love, supra note 97, at 1347–48.
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2. If Patent Hold-Out is the Problem,
Patent Assertion Entities Are Not the Solution
In light of current policy debates, then, the relevant question is not,
should we be worried about hold-out, but, does the current model of patent
assertion do a good job of rewarding and incenting innovation? On this score
the available empirical evidence is not encouraging. The transaction costs
associated with PAE assertions appear, in some cases, to dwarf the return to
the inventors.160 Many PAE assertions focus on the “wrong” target—small
companies161 and end users or sellers—because the true party in interest—
the manufacturer—is a harder target. The manufacturer is more likely to be
more patent sophisticated, have better access to defensive prior art, and more
invested in establishing a reputation for toughness lest they be targeted by
other patent asserters.162 As a result, the party that can most efficiently resolve the dispute, the supplier, often is left off the case.163 The returns generated from such campaigns are more likely to reflect the avoidance of legal
costs, rather than the true economic value of the patent.
In addition, the economics of patent assertion create their own distortions. The economies of scale that make patent assertion worthwhile require
patent assertion entities to be very selective, choosing carefully a few patents
to assert over and over.164 This approach, while practical, necessarily shuts
out many patents and patentees. That might be a good thing, filtering out
many low-value patents, but it fails to provide a complete solution to holdout—as PAEs cannot vindicate the rights of every deserving patentholder. In
addition, the patents that are the most valuable from an assertion perspective—old and therefore less vulnerable to prior art challenges,165 broadly
160.
See James E. Bessen, Michael J. Meurer & Jennifer L. Ford, The Private and Social
Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REG. 26, available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/5/v34n4-1.pdf; James Bessen & Michael Meurer, Patent Trolls in
Public, PATENTLY-O (March 19, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/patent-trolls-inpublic.html (estimating that only 26% of licensing revenues, on average, go to inventors);
DOJ/FTC Presentation, supra note 57 (citing an RPX survey covering 900 litigations, in the
majority of them legal costs exceeded settlement costs). But see Chien, supra note 157, at 18
(documenting a wide variety of deal points among innovators and the PAEs that monetize their
patents (lump sum or “ranging from 10% to 67%, sometimes in combination with an upfront
payment”)).
161.
A high percentage of unique defendants to PAE cases make $10M or less. See
Chien, supra note 28, at 471.
162.
Chien & Reines, supra note 29, at 242–44.
163.
Id. at 243.
164.
Chien, supra note 62 (describing the PAE business model as one that is based on
economies of scale and relies on using the same patents, in the same venues, using the same
contingent fee lawyers); accord Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
457, 472 (2012).
165.
See, e.g., Love, supra note 97, at 1331 (finding that NPEs disproportionately assert
patents at the end of their term).
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worded, detectably infringed, and understandable by a jury—are not necessarily the ones that have contributed the most to the field.
For patent assertion to better address the problem of patent hold-out, it
should cost less, return more to inventors, focus on the right targets, and
reward true technical contribution—for example where there is high patent
quality or industry recognition, or where the behavior is the most egregious,
as in the case of copying—rather than patent contribution.
B. Critiquing Patent Hold-Up
Nor does patent hold-up theory get everything right. One common criticism is that hold-up tends to lump very different patentholders and situations
together, painting all acts of patent enforcement with far too broad a brush.
Another criticism asserts that, despite the barrage of solutions that have been
attempted to solve the hold-up problem, hold-up appears to continue.
1. All Patent Hold-Up is Not Created Equal
One major criticism of hold-up theory is that, by casting the mere legal
act of patent enforcement in pejorative terms, hold-up causes suppliers to dig
in, refuse to pay, and spend money resisting meritorious assertions. To the
extent that hold-up theory encourages a misimpression that all patent enforcement actions are based on low quality patents, or that all patent enforcement has the same (limited) social value,166 it feeds the inefficiencies that
flow from company refusals to pay.
Indeed, the operating companies that are the most likely to criticize trolling have also been accused of engaging in it. The practice of privateering,
or using proxies or shell companies to wage patent wars against one’s rivals,167 has been described—though no one knows to what extent it is taking
place. The concern that companies will sell their patents to trolls has become
so prevalent that several companies have made public commitments to prevent it from happening. Twitter’s Inventor’s Patent License limits the company’s ability to use its patents in offensive ways.168 By signing on to the
License on Transfer (LOT) agreement, Google, Cannon, SAP, and several
other companies have agreed to grant each other licenses in the event that
166.
Cotropia, Kesan, & Schwartz, supra note 27, at 8–10 (describing subcategories of
patent assertion entities and their relative social value as measured for example, by the returns
of the assertion to the inventor.)
167.
For a discussion on patent privateers, see Tom Ewing, Introducing the Patent Privateers, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 31, 31–32. See also Chien, supra
note 5, at 320–32 (describing several examples of patents being transferred from an operating
company to a patent troll that companies were exposed to).
168.
Adam Messinger, Introducing the Innovator’s Patent Agreement, TWITTER BLOG
(Apr. 17, 2012), available at https://blog.twitter.com/2012/introducing-innovators-patentagreement (describing Twitter’s Innovator’s Patent Agreement (IPA), “a commitment from
Twitter to our employees that the patents they assign can only be used for defensive
purposes”).
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they eventually sell their patents. Cisco and Yahoo have made public, unilateral promises not to sell their patents to trolls.169
Another criticism of patent hold-up, according to critics, is that it does
not really exist because the reputational costs and repeat player nature of
interactions between patentees and infringers encourage patentees to “play
nice.”170 They prefer private ordering arrangements, like standards rules and
patent pools,171 to government solutions.
These criticisms have their greatest force when applied to conflicts between repeat players who have symmetric stakes and participate in private
ordering activities, for example, standards-setting.172 Indeed, those who have
looked for evidence that hold-up has actually occurred in this context have
found a lack of empirical evidence.173
But these reassurances are much less persuasive when applied to certain,
though not all, types of patent trolls. A special-purpose entity formed solely
to assert a single patent portfolio174 is, by definition, not a repeat player.175
Because it does not make anything, it cannot be countersued, has no need for
patent cross-licenses, and it cannot sign agreements to be part of a standard
when it only acquires the patents long after the standard has been formed.
Importantly, special purpose entities also do not have a market reputation to
defend. Certain enterprises behind lawsuits have been known to studiously
avoid reputational consequences by incorporating large numbers of LLCs so
that related demands cannot be identified.176 The measurable harm to innovation—in the form of delayed hiring, business pivots, and the killing of
169.

Non-SDO Patent Statements and Commitments, PROGRAM ON INFO. JUSTICE & INPROP., http://www.pijip.org/non-sdo-patent-commitments/ (last updated June 21,

TELLECTUAL

2014).
170.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein et al., The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up
Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 20 (2012) (finding that
reputational costs and repeat interactions are a solution to patent hold-up).
171.
Id. at 5; see also Robert Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions:
The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 123,
133 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
172.
See, e.g., Roger G. Brooks, Patent “Hold-Up,” Standards-Setting Organizations
And The FTC’s Campaign Against Innovators, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 435, 475 (2011) (“[T]here is no
systemic patent hold-up problem damaging the interests of consumers or discouraging technological innovation and implementation—either in the context of standardized technologies or
more generally.”).
173.
Id. at 446–48 (citing comments from standards setting bodies, companies, and one
professor to support its position).
174.
Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1
(2012) (describing the practice of PAE Intellectual Ventures setting up a shell company for
each patent acquisition).
175.
Though, if owned by a larger and well-known patent assertion entity, it may be.
176.
Joe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000—for Using Scanners, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 2,
2013, 9:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trolls-want-1000-for-using-scanners/ (describing the “alphabet soup” tactics of the “scanner patent troll” patent assertion entity that sent demand letters through entities named AccNum, AllLed, AdzPro,
CalNeb, ChaPac, FanPar, FasLan, FulNer, GosNel, and HunLos).
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products and product lines—by troll campaigns has also been
documented.177
History also belies the assertion that private ordering can provide a complete solution to patent trolling. Two other eras of patent trolling bear a
striking resemblance to the present. One, noted previously, involved the patent “sharks” that asserted design patents en masse against farmers, about
which then-Senator Isaac Christiancy said in 1879, “procure[d] an assignment of . . . [a] useless patent, and at once proceed to levy blackmail . . .
upon any man who has ever manufactured or sold, or even used, the later
and valuable invention; hundreds, at least, among the innocent users, choose
to compromise rather than run the risk of ruin from lawsuits; . . . millions are
thus filched and extorted from the people every year.”178 Another involved
the railroad industry of the 1880s, which found itself under attack by lawsuits brought by “avaricious patent agents”179 who bought and asserted patents. During these two eras, Congressional, PTO, and court leadership were
key to curbing the perceived excesses of patent assertion and restoring patent
equilibrium.180
In addition, the filing of patent cases at the International Trade Commission (ITC) in order to access remedies that a district court would likely withhold has presented particular hold-up concerns.181 This is because the ITC,
can only award injunctions, not monetary damages, and is more likely than a
court to do so.182 Patent holders have filed a sizeable number of cases at the
ITC on the basis of standard essential patents,183 including when the patent
holder has previously made a commitment to license the patent on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. This development has proven so troubling
that the DOJ, FTC, and President have weighed in to stop it.184

177.
See Chien, supra note 28, at 2, 15.
178.
See Chien, supra note 47, at 327 (2012) (citing 8 CONG. REC. 307-08 (1879) (statement of Sen. Christiancy)).
179.
Chien, supra note 47, at 333 (citing Steven W. Usselman & Richard R. John, Patent
Politics: Intellectual Property, the Railroad Industry, and the Problem of Monopoly, 18 J.
POL’Y HIST. 96, 98–99 (2006)).
180.
Chien, supra note 47, at 331–32; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 9.
181.
Described, for example, in Chien & Lemley, supra note 85, at 1.
182.
Id. at 10 fig. 1, 16 fig. 3 (documenting variable injunction rates in district court
ranging from 7–100% in district court, as compared to an essentially automatic exclusion order
grant rate in the ITC).
183.
See, e.g., SEP or Related Litigations, THE ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (last visited
Aug. 4, 2013), http://essentialpatentblog.com/list-of-litigations-involving-seps/ (listing the
large numbers of ITC cases involving SEPS).
184.
Letter from Michael B. G. Froman to Irving A. Williamson, supra note 25 (regarding Inv. No. 337-TA-794).
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2. Changing Remedies Has Not Yet Solved The Hold-Up Problem;
Hold-Out Explains Why
Another flaw of hold-up theory is that it cannot explain why, despite
apparent progress with respect to remedies, patent hold-up has become
more, not less, frequent. Proponents of hold-up theory have recommended
reforming patent remedies due to the leverage posed by the threat of an
injunction, unsustainable royalty demands, and outsized damage awards.185
As described earlier, the courts have largely answered their call.186
However, by focusing exclusively on reducing the leverage associated
with patent remedies, hold-up theory has largely ignored the additional, and
in some cases more urgent, leverage that the high cost of defense creates,
particularly for small defendants.187 When it costs close to a million dollars
to defend a case,188 even if there is no threat of injunction or damages above
a certain amount, it will always be cheaper to settle.
Another reason that changes to damages law have not necessarily yet
had their desired effect is that they do not necessarily appeal to decisionmakers’ sense of fairness. Jurors’ “willingness to disregard the boundaries of
law and evidence”189 to arrive at a just outcome, suggests that changing the
law alone will not be the answer to reducing hold-up. The answer may be, in
part, to better educate jurors on the role of the patent system within the
broader social context and about the impacts of litigation and remedies on
defendants, in particular small defendants, as well as to better police the
evidence jurors are allowed to see. The increasing attention being given to
the patent system by non-experts190 and awareness of patent trolling created
by President Obama publicly likening patent trolling to “extortion,”191 Congressional engagement and educational videos,192 is also likely to have an
impact. The availability of injunctions for component inventions should be
clarified and communicated in jury instructions, so that courts have appropriate guidance when given the “nuclear option” of an injunction.

185.
Described supra at Section I.B.3.
186.
Described supra at Section I.C.
187.
DOJ/FTC Presentation, supra note 57, at 12–19.
188.
See generally Patent Litigation Survey, supra note 31, at 3.
189.
Gooding & Rooklidge, supra note 122, at 485.
190.
See, e.g., Colbert Report, supra note 79; Jolie, supra note 79.
191.
Catherine Clifford, Obama Takes Aim at ‘Patent Trolls’, ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 15,
2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/225842.
192.
See, e.g., USHouseJudiciaryGOP, Henry Ford, Patent Trolling, & the Innovation
Act: A Patent Reform Primer, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
uSEH7nYTRh4.
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Combining “hold-out” and “hold-up” perspectives reveals surprising
pathways to a better patent system, focused as much on the design as on the
doctrine of patent law. Rather than trying to eliminate all technology patents,
or to enforce all of them, courts and policymakers should develop ways for
parties, early on, to determine the value of a patent, or at least a range of
values, and for courts to hear and decide dispositive issues. Instead of trying
to make patent law perfect, the patent process should be made cheaper, more
streamlined, and more equitable.
This part considers four promising ways of doing so: 1) reducing duplication and forum shopping by improving coordination between the venues;
2) early adjudication of dispositive issues, including patent validity and copying; 3) early damages disclosure and non-expert damages methodologies;
and 4) promoting symmetry between economically dissimilar parties and
proportionality between the economic value of a patent and the cost of fighting about it, through fee- and cost-shifting. Many of these suggestions could
be implemented in a variety of ways: through jury instructions and case
management, including across districts, through the Patent Pilot Program,193
case law development, and legislative change.
A. Reducing Duplication and Forum Shopping,
Improving Coordination194
Hold-up and hold-out are supported in part by differences in the venues
in which the same patent issues can be simultaneously adjudicated. These
differences support divergent expectations about case outcomes and often
translate into the greater complexity and cost associated with managing the
same case in several venues. Patentees who are held-out on may feel that
they have no choice but to pursue their claims in the most advantageous
jurisdictions, while defendants that believe that they are being held-up feel
outrage that they are being dragged into venues to which they have little
connection.
To enforce a patent, a court must find the patent to be valid and infringed, and award an appropriate remedy. But each of these issues can be
193.
A program started in 2011 for concentrating expertise with patent cases within patent “Pilot” districts in which designated judges who want patent cases can accept them from
non-designated judges that decline them. Described in Pilot Program to Enhance Expertise in
Patent Cases, U.S. CTS., (Feb. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/11-0201/Pilot_Program_to_Enhance_Expertise_in_Patent_Cases.aspx.
194.
See overview in Abusive Patent Litigation: The Issues Impacting American
Competiveness and Job Creation at the International Trade Commission and Beyond: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 42-48 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 Chien Testimony] (prepared statement
of Prof. Colleen V. Chien).
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adjudicated in multiple venues simultaneously. A patent’s validity, for example, can be challenged in the PTO, the district court, and the International
Trade Commission, also known as the “unholy trifecta” of patent law.195 The
ITC and district court apply different standards for making this determination than does the PTO (which has, within the agency, multiple ways of
doing so),196 and all three venues offer different procedures.
The procedures and remedies used in each venue vary as well. A patent
can be enforced in both the district court and the ITC, but the remedies and
procedures available to the parties are different, and the standards for granting injunctive relief are also different, as previously described. While district
court decisions bind the ITC, the inverse is not true, even though the ITC
decides cases more quickly than the district courts.197 Within the district
court, multiple cases on the same patent can be filed within different district
courts, and often are, for forum shopping and jurisdictional reasons; and the
differences between district courts mean that forum-shopping is a known
fact of patent litigation life.198
These complexities create incentives for litigants to litigate the same
issues in multiple venues, and to choose venues for the strategic advantages
they provide. The majority of inter partes reviews have been filed on patents
that are also in litigation.199 Over 90% of ITC patent cases in 2012 had a
district court counterpart.200 PAEs may file cases against a customer to secure a favorable venue, while the manufacturer may later seek to file a declaratory judgment action to litigate the same issue in their preferred
venue.201 The different standards in each district potentially invite waste by
defendants and plaintiffs and encourage forum-shopping. It also encourages
each side to “take its chances”—hoping for a decisive win in one venue even
while their odds are lower in another one.
One way to decrease the incentive for cross-venue forum shopping is by
tightening the interfaces between fora so that parallel filings do not result in
duplicative proceedings. There is statutory support for coordinating between
the venues—according to 28 USC § 1659 a district court should, upon re195.
Id. at 43.
196.
As of September 2012: (1) Post-Grant Review (PGR); (2) Modified Inter Partes
Review (IPR); (3) Transitional Post-Grant Review for business method patents; (4) Ex parte
reexamination. Summarized in Paul R. Steadman et al., Post-Issuance Patent Review, INTELL.
PROP. MAG., Nov. 2011, at 99, 99.
197.
Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at
the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 64 (2008).
198.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q. J. 401,
402 (2010) (“Forum shopping is alive and well in patent law. . . . [It] shows no signs of
disappearing.”).
199.
See, e.g., RPX Corp., supra note 27, at 41 (reporting data showing that 70–97% of
patents subject to an IPR were also the subject of district court litigation).
200.
2013 Chien Testimony, supra note 194, at 43.
201.
Chien & Reines, supra note 29, at 21 (arguing for the need for a stay of the customer case when the manufacturer case is pending).
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quest of either party, stay its action when a parallel case is pending at the
ITC. The district court may also stay its case when the patent is challenged
at the USPTO.
To increase a district court’s confidence that a stay will not merely delay
but will actually result in resolution of issues, the ITC and USPTO should
provide clear notice of the timeline of adjudication and procedures by the
non-court, and to the extent possible, the disposition of all the issues faced
by the court.202 The ITC’s record of announcing and sticking to a timeline
has created a record of predictability in this regard.203 The USPTO’s work
building confidence in its post-AIA proceedings—including by facilitating
communications between the district courts and the USPTO—has also been
well-received, and the rate of stay is estimated to be 53–67% according to
recent statistics.204
The substantive standards should also be harmonized. When the ITC
hears a case, it should apply the same standard as does the district court to
the decision of whether or not to grant an injunction—but right now, the
ITC’s habit of always granting injunctive relief to a prevailing complainant
contrasts starkly with the district court’s record in the several years of
awarding injunctions in only 75% of cases.205 Right now, the USPTO can
only review the majority of issued patent cases on a few of the bases that a
district court can.206 Expanding the bases for review so that the USPTO can
hear the full suite of patent-eligibility challenges, including claim definiteness, and clarity, would avoid the need for a court to revisit validity after the
USPTO has just done so.
Another source of duplication arises when hundreds of adopters of a
technology, rather than the single supplier of the technology, are pursued for
patent infringement. Though there are sometimes practical reasons for these
202.
For example, by reviewing all, rather than just a portion, of the challenged claims.
See Timothy K. Wilson & John S. Sieman, Guest Post: PTAB Partial Institution of IPR and
CBM Review Violates the AIA—But there is a Simple Fix, PATENTLY-O (May 29, 2014), http://
patentlyo.com/patent/ptab (arguing that the USPTO’s partial institution of IPR may result in
duplication or inconsistency when the non-reviewed claims are reviewed by the district court).
203.
Chien, supra note 197, at 101.
204.
Robert Arcamona & David Cavanaugh, Stays to Litigation Pending IPR and CBM
Review: Statistics, Trends, and Key Issues, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (Mar. 2014), available at
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/
IP-today-stays-to-litigation-pending.pdf.
205.
Chien & Lemley, supra note 85, at 16 fig. 3.
206.
See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg.
48,680 (Aug. 14, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fr_specific_tri
al.pdf. The covered business method transitional program, described supra note 94, allows the
USPTO to review issued patents according to all grounds of patentabilty, but is limited to
qualifying financial services data processing patents. In contrast, in inter partes review, which
is available for all issued patents, the USPTO may reconsider the validity patents in light only
of patents or printed publications. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
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suits, they are happening with increasing frequency.207 Absent compelling
reasons, obstacles to manufacturers standing behind their products—for example, when a court fails to find declaratory judgment jurisdiction, denies
the manufacturer the right to intervene, or allows discovery to proceed
against customers even when a manufacturer is involved, should be
removed.208
B. Prioritize Early Disposition
Hold-up and hold-out happen because the parties disagree about whether
the target needs a license. Among the various assessments that need to be
made in order for a court to rule, some are dispositive and in some cases, do
not require intensive discovery. These could include the availability of defenses like contract-based exhaustion and certain grounds of patent invalidity (such as patentable subject matter), as well as the meaning of a key claim
term. Early determination of dispositive issues, coupled with higher quality
complaints, could reduce the risks and costs for both plaintiffs and
defendants.
In the spring and fall of 2013, I and others surveyed over five hundred
in-house, plaintiffs’, and general patent attorneys about their perspectives on
over twenty patent reforms and practices, including recent judicial and legislative reforms (misjoinder, post-grant review, the Federal Circuit’s e-Discovery Model order, damages reform, and the patent pilot program) and a
host of case management practices covering claim construction, summary
judgment, and the staging or timing of patent litigation. The practice among
all of them that had the strongest overall rating among these communities
was the value of judges making timely decisions on summary judgments
motions—with an overall effectiveness rating of 86% (out of 100%).209 In a
follow-up discussion of these results, judges said that they would be more
inclined to decide summary judgment motions early if the parties agreed to
have all of their motions heard at once, rather than bringing them serially.210
207.
See, e.g., Chien & Reines, supra note 29, at 235–36.
208.
See, e.g., Chien & Reines, supra note 29, at 238–40 (advocating bolstering of declaratory judgment jurisdiction and intervention rights for suppliers, prioritization of dispositive issues, stay of customer discovery, and interventions that would make end users less
attractive litigation targets).
209.
Patent Litigation Survey, supra note 31, at 175. The “overall effectiveness” rating
was calculated by the authors by “ask[ing] survey takers to rate each practice, proposal, or
development on the basis of its effectiveness in increasing the efficiency of patent litigation.”
Id. at 146. The scores were then converted “into numerical representations of ‘overall effectiveness,’ from 0% (least effective) to 100% (most effective).” Id. Among inside counsel, this
intervention received an 85% effectiveness rating (N=93), and among outside counsel
(N=313), it received an 86% effectiveness rating. Id. at 175. Of the outside counsel, 54%
equally represented plaintiffs and defendants, 34% primarily represented defendants and 12%
primarily represented plaintiffs. Id. at 201.
210.
Discussions at the Federal Circuit Bar Association’s 2013 Advanced Complex Litigation Series at the Santa Clara University School of Law (May 3, 2013).
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The ITC has taken the lead in early disposition by announcing a pilot
program that provides for an early determination within the first 100 days of
a case.211 The program has been praised for its potential to reduce costs and
narrow the scope of the hearing, and includes features like staying discovery
on all issues other than case-dispositive issues.212 If it succeeds in doing so,
district courts could follow suit, through legislative means or judicial prioritization of cases.
C. Early Patent Valuation
Hold-up and hold-out also occur because the parties disagree on the
value of a patent. One reason for this is that they have very different reference frames for calculating this value—defendants, for example, are often
loath to provide sensitive financial information about sales, profits or past
licenses, for example, until they have to. Another is the important role
played by non-specialist juries and a flexible legal standard for calculating
damages that enables damages experts to come to diametrically opposing
opinions about the value of a patent, driving even further apart parties’ expectations. Steps could be taken to reduce each of these drivers to the gap in
expectations between the parties and facilitate earlier dispute resolution.
Patentholders and their targets should know ahead of time the range of a
patent’s worth, instead of relying on courts to make the determination. One
way to do so would be to allow parties to give up damages precision in favor
of speed: as one prominent alternative solutions provider relayed to me,
lawmakers should “[f]ocus on speed—business and commerce need certainty and speed—not Georgia Pacific factors after 36 months.”213 Mechanisms that favor expediency over precision include rate tables,214
211.
First implemented in Certain Products Having Laminated Packaging, Laminated
Packaging, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-874, USITC 8 Fed. Reg. 19,007 (Mar.
22, 2013) (notice of institution of investigation), followed by Pilot Program Will Test Early
Disposition of Certain Section 337 Investigations, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www
.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/featured_news/337pilot_article.htm (last visited Sept. 21,
2014).
212.
Robert Rogers, Benefits of ITC’s New Early Disposition Pilot Program, LAW360
(July 16, 2013, 4:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/457675/benefits-of-itc-s-new-earlydisposition-pilot-program. However, since being instituted, it does not appear that the early
disposition program has been used except in the single case that started the program, Products
Having Laminated Packaging, Laminated Packaging, and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337TA-874.
213.
Email from Confidential Source to Author (Aug. 23, 2013) (on file with the Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review).
214.
Comments from Intellectual Prop. Creators Assoc. to U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Apr. 29, 2013) (on file with United Stated Patent and Trademark Office), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/patents/comments/patent_small_claims_court_rev_3.pdf (proposing “royalty rates for various classes of inventions and industries be [established by a ‘royalty rate commissioner]”).
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mediation,215 or employing a simplistic formula for reducing the information
and transaction costs associated with patent valuation should be explored
(for example, based on lines of code or total patents on the feature based on
a keyword search). Although some may balk at the thought of million dollar
price-tags to patents being assigned based on such “rules of thumb,” in reality estimation techniques have frequently been used to determine the value
of ex ante licenses.216 If a patent is only one of a thousand that a product
reads on, and is worth less than a cent per unit at best, as has been determined in the case of Microsoft Windows’ products practicing certain standards essential patents,217 and the parties both know that ahead of time,
perhaps paying that rate will be a better option than arguing about its
enforceability.
D. Promote Proportionality and Symmetry
Finally, the patent system should provide incentives and ways for cases
to be resolved at costs that are proportional to their value. The legal costs of
case should not outstrip the value of the case, as it currently true of lowvalue cases.218 The incentive of each party to drive up the costs of the
other—via holding up or holding-out—should also be reduced.
To proportionally right-size patent proceedings, options like excluding
attorneys,219 tele-conference based trials, eliminating unnecessary discovery
and witnesses,220 eliminating juries, and capping damages, based on, for example, revenue or cost of component parts,221 have been suggested by those
on both sides of the issue222 and could be offered to litigants as options for
pursuing low-cost and efficient relief. The value of the case should be deter215.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl A. Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135 (2013).
216.
Chien, supra note 5, at 308 (describing the “ruler” and keyword-based methodologies for determining cross-licensing royalties).
217.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012); Microsoft
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-01823-JLR (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (setting a royalty
of 0.55 to 16.39 cents per unit for Windows and Xbox products for access to Motorola’s H.264
SEP patent portfolio).
218.
See supra Fig. 1.
219.
Comments from Intellectual Prop. Creators Assoc. to U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 214.
220.
Comments from Matthew Tanielian and Alex V. Chachkes to U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Apr. 30, 2013) (on file with United Stated Patent and Trademark Office), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/patents/comments/753609930-1_cpf_-_letter_to_uspto
.pdf.
221.
Comments from Michael Risch to U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Mar. 9, 2013)
(on file with United States Patent and Trademark Office), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
ip/global/patents/comments/comments_to_us_pto_re_patent_small_claims.pdf.
222.
Cf. id. (supporting creation of a small claims court); Comments from Intellectual
Prop. Creators Assoc. to U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, supra note 214 (supporting creation
of a small claims court); Comments from Tanielian & Chachkes to U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, supra note 220 (opposing creation of a small claims court).
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mined based on using defendant’s product revenue as a cap. Many litigants
in this situation, in search of a stable business environment, may give up due
process for certainty and low transaction costs.
There are also several ways to encourage parties to keep needless costs
down, primarily by sanctioning them. By making two-way fee-shifting the
norm, the parties will think twice about driving up the costs of the other side,
given the risk that they may have to ultimately pay these costs.223 Given the
burden that discovery costs represent, in addition, “fishing expeditions” that
account for a large amount of the cost but often lead to miniscule amounts of
admitted evidence224 should be discouraged. This could be accomplished by
requiring parties to pay for the discovery they request beyond the exchange
of “core” evidence. More specifically, “in any patent lawsuit . . . normal
rules of discovery would apply with respect to [ ] core documents—that is,
the person producing the documents pays the cost of production . . .
[A]dditional discovery is permissible . . . The difference is that the party
requesting such other discovery bears the cost of paying for that discovery.”225 The rejection of reasonable offers may in some cases also deserve
financial sanction, using tools like Federal Rule of Civil Procedure No.
68.226
A major critique of reducing the unnecessary costs of litigation is that it
will lead to greater assertion, removing the benefits of non-assertion that
have previously been discussed.227 This is a real concern. However, there
will also be costs associated with bringing a patent case, including potential
loss of the patent and the costs of developing the initial claim, which will
likely rise due to the Federal Judicial Conference’s recent decision to elimi-

223.
See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651 (1982). As Thomas Rowe has stated, generally speaking, feeshifting is intended to discourage “undesirable behavior in the bringing and conduct of litigation”; in addition to impacting the decision whether to sue, it can influence “whether to resist
[suit], choices whether to use various tactics, and decisions about the amount and timing of
settlement.” Id. at 652–53. See also Octane Fitness, LLC. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (providing more discretion to courts to shift fees in patent cases); Highmark
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (providing more discretion to
courts to shift fees in patent cases); Rader et al., supra note 72 (calling on district courts to use
their discretion to shift fees).
224.
See, e.g., Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation & Jobs,
and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the
Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 44–48 (2013) (prepared statement of
Philip Boswell, Senior Vice President and General Counsel of SAS) (reporting that, out of 10
million documents collected in a SAS case, “only 1,873 documents, or .000183%, appeared on
an evidence list as possibly being introduced at trial”).
225.
Id. at 108.
226.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 68.
227.
See discussion supra Part III.1.a.

Fall 2014]

Holding Up and Holding Out

41

nate barebones complaint forms.228 Fee-shifting also cuts both ways and will
serve as a check on those making questionable assertions as well as those
who refuse to engage and hold-out unreasonably.
CONCLUSION
There are two sides to every story, and patent enforcement is no exception. To those concerned about patent hold-up, the problem is patenthoders
making questionable assertions, after the product is already made, wielding
the threat or pain of a lawsuit or uncertain remedies. To patentholders who
complain about patent hold-out, the problem is large companies, who shirk
their responsibilities and ignore reasonable licensing offers made early on,
the multiple risks of invalidation that patentholders must face when they
bring their suits, and the inordinate costs of litigation.
By focusing on the features of the patent system that are problematic
according to both patent hold-up and patent hold-out—namely the high
costs, uncertainty, and asymmetry of patent enforcement—both problems
can be reduced. Scholars and others have focused for decades on doctrinal
debates and substantive policy-making. But as these efforts on patent doctrine continue, more attention to the design of patent law and the resolution
of patent disputes, deserve attention. This Article applied this lens to reveal
fresh insights and stimulate further thinking and dialog about how to improve the patent system.
In particular, I propose reducing duplication and forum shopping by improving coordination between the venues; reducing costs by early adjudication of dispositive issues, including patent validity and copying, promoting
certainty by engaging in early damages disclosure and non-expert damages
methodologies; and promoting symmetry between economically dissimilar
parties and proportionality between the economic value of a patent and the
cost of fighting about it, through fee- and cost-shifting. As the patent system
continues to experience momentous change, these adjustments are well
worth considering and implementing.

228.
Vin Gurrieri, Judges Vote to Nix Rule Creating Patent Complaint Forms, LAW360
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/578149/judges-vote-to-nix-rule-creating-pat
ent-complaint-forms.

